The Bush Presidency (Part Two)

Just like any other Administration, whether this one has been effective or not depends on who is asked. One can most definitely claim this has been a forceful and committed Administration. One aspect of President Bush which intrigued many and angered others was his ability to focus on a topic and, through heavy repetition, ram the point home to some sort of legislative or material victory. This occurred with many important issues, such as Iraq or the tax cuts. It seemed this was a unique gift of Bush's, and even though repetition is a loose rule in politics, he seemed to be able to do it better than anyone else. He has recently tried this tactic with Social Security, but all evidence suggests it has failed (in fact, a Congressman has said he has received the President's approval for a new plan on Social Security that doesn't include private accounts, which were a big part of previous Administration proposals), lending early anecdotal credence to assertions that presidential second terms are often unsuccessful. Another interesting side of his Presidency began to be witnessed after 9-11; suddenly, a President notorious for poor speaking and general incoherency seemed to have "found his voice." The President apparently gained a new moral urgency to defend America and, just as importantly, spread freedom and democracy around the world. This last point has been extremely polemical. Bush has openly outlined his desire to see the Middle East and many other nations around the world that are currently ruled by dictatorial, theocratic, or just generally oppressive regimes transform into open and free democracies. I strongly support his vision here; in a sense, I must, because I am a liberal, and above all a liberal is one who wants liberty, which is essentially what Bush wants to give these people as well (it gets more complicated than this, but let's leave it there for now). That curt analysis may have seemed naive, since US strategic considerations are and have been far more important to this Administration and preceding ones than ideals (I mean, who in the US government was thinking about liberty when the Indians were wiped out in decades of conflict? Or who was thinking about liberty during Reagan and times when we supplied the 'Butcher of Baghdad' with chemical weapons? Or gave Osama's mujahedin $3 billion and stinger missiles in the '80s so they could fight the Soviets? Or even now when we're espousing democracy but supporting an autocrat in Pakistan?) or lofty standards. But certainly most geostrategic decisions are taken in light of what could benefit the nation, and it is most advantageous for the Bush Administration to prop up democracy in the Middle East, the site of massive oil reserves to which America is heavily dependent, rather than in regions that don't seem to hold incentives for American supervision. This is spectacularly hypocritical, but, in my view, that doesn't matter at all. America is the world's superpower and the number of objectives it has to accomplish are numerous, complex, and sometimes confusing, so it is no secret that in pursuing those objectives it will make some mistakes in terms of stated policy versus executed policy. We shouldn't really frown on America for this; in a very real sense, it's difficult for a nation like America NOT to make these sorts of mistakes. Just look at other superpowers in the past: Rome began to allow more and more the settlement of barbarians inside its territories once it became clear their extrication would be difficult, France in the 16th century allied with the dreaded Ottoman Empire for strategic gains in Italy and again caused surprised in the mid-18th century when she allied with previous foe Austria to fight the Prussians in the Seven Years War, and Britain allied with France (these two nations had produced perhaps the greatest military rivalry in all of history) in the late 19th century to counter the growing threat of Germany, all cases which loosely reveal how particular superpowers have suspended articulated or traditional policies to accommodate new realities. To those ends, America is doing what has mostly always been done. What's most important is that America is actually advocating for freedom and democracy somewhere, and while not everyone in the world may be helped by this 'altruism,' some will indeed benefit (and have already benefited, most notably the Lebanese, where international pressure spearheaded by the US forced Syrian troops to pull back after years of occupation). One of the key questions surrounding the debate is what the new American policy means for the Middle East. Some nations have already revealed signs of tacit cooperation in terms of electoral reform, but much more work still has to be done. The Middle East must be instructed more in the area of women's rights, a field where it is horribly unprepared or behind (for example, it is puzzling to a Westerner why a woman wears a veil when the Koran instructs nothing on the act and when the veil was originally intended for the affluent and upper-class women of Islamic society). But the progress has been encouraging if at this stage only tentative. Many believe Bush's efforts in the Middle East are too hopeful and somewhat ignorant or naive since the doctrines being followed are not all that mindful of the sociopolitical nature of the region. They argue (partly) that America treats the people of the region as if they were like Americans and that such a move can only lead to failure. Again, these views may turn out to be correct. The chronic problem we've encountered in this analysis is that "we don't know yet." What transpires in the Middle East may also be a reflection of the amount of attention the US is willing to give to the region, which presently seems to indicate it will be less and less as the years go by due to the rise of China in the Far East. If America is willing to expend great amounts of political, military, and economic capital on the region, then events may turn out well after all ('well' relative to America). A new feature of Bush's new policies to combat terrorism has been pre-emption. This has conjured just as much controversy as the drive for spreading democracy. Although we mentioned this before, we are going to cover it again in more detail. Unlike the drive for democracy, this one appears to have colossal implications. Part of the difference lies in the fact that while not every democratic nation has the capabilities to spread its form of government to other regions, every democratic nation (and every nation period) does have the capability to use the doctrine of pre-emption in its foreign policy. President Bush's critics have used this simple point to lambaste the doctrine, arguing how many other nations (some not friendly to American interests, particularly Chinese designs on Taiwan) could get carried away in much the same manner as America supposedly did with Iraq, and hence spread pandemonium and chaos. One problem many have had with the policy is simply conceptual; many have had a hard time stomaching what appears to be a drastic departure from typical America foreign policy, known for, according to the critics, its defensive posture. Bush's supporters have commented that sort of defensive posture will not be sufficient to defeat the parlous nature of 21st century terrorism; America will simply have to be on the constant offensive if it is to have realistic chances of prevailing. Besides bringing to the table varying views on combating the global war on terror, pre-emption also raises some haunting specters for America's future: if this country is tied down in offensive ventures for prolonged periods of time, can it geostrategically survive the heavy involvements? Can it withstand the sizeable amounts of occasional spending bills for hotspots like Iraq or Afghanistan? Can it afford to increase its defense budget to sizes comparable to the GDP of some large nations? The answers to these questions are, again, unknown. But we can speculate. A key component to America's future strength will be the Administration in power; if there is a government which chooses not to follow Bush's terrorist strategy, then pre-emption and heavy American global involvement for the purpose of terrorism could collapse or wither away, allowing for the continuation of America's unquestioned hegemony. On the other hand (oversimplification is practically inevitable here, statements like "on the other hand" revealing a case of dialectics which I don't fully believe are there judging by the pluralistic formulation of foreign policy, but time restrictions force the simplified version of the story), future administrations could continue Bush's policies and plunge America into many localized conflicts for the name of fighting terrorism. This would be very dangerous. America may be worn down in many ways, but perhaps the two most important would be the loss of political will (a nascent manifestation in the Iraqi conflict) and the deterioration of military capabilities. These two factors more than any others caused the collapse of the Western Roman Empire, but I want to emphasize I'm not equating Rome then to America now. The enemies the two faced are different and the context of the worlds in which they live are completely different. But while I'm not equating them, I am showing a similarity. Overextension of (particularly) military forces (something that gave Rome a headache, seeing as how they had only 500,000 soldiers of inferior quality, at least when compared to previous Roman legions, to protect borders throughout Europe and the Middle East) worries many in the current Administration and other observers and experts. While palpably America is very strong, is it that strong? Can it do all these things and essentially hope to maintain parity with a quickly growing China 30, 40, or 50 years in the future? To be determined....mending relations with European allies will also be a key objective of future administrations. The Iraqi war tore through the very warm relations sewed after the 9-11 attacks. To most Europeans, there seemed to be little in terms of logic operating amidst the British and the Americans when they went to war. The rift has not been resolved to this day. Many nations in Europe (like France) feel vindicated in their decisions not to participate because of recurring problems with the insurgency. The other side of the Atlantic resents, almost in a child-like manner, the intransigence of many nations who they feel are indebted to America for previous affairs (World War I and II come to mind). I have personally seen this American resentment as something approaching insanity; in an interest-based geostrategic world, those nations are not entitled to do anything for you, whether you may like it or not. Present considerations supersede historical ties; after all, if we are to adopt the whining approach as some American conservatives have, where was America in the beginning of World War I in terms of helping a friend who was mostly responsible for its independence (France)? Or what about World War II? America did not enter the conflict until it was directly attacked itself; before Pearl Harbor, many Americas simply didn't want to be involved in Europe's wars. These kinds of charges and countercharges have resolved little; it is simply better for both sides to recognize they have differences and try to rebuild erstwhile strong relationships with those differences in mind. Despite recent events to the contrary, Europe can be a powerful ally to America. Conceivably, the Europeans will resolve the current and bitter disputes revolving around the budget or a formal constitution and will one day have a coherent foreign policy that could prove useful to America in upcoming dealings with China. Some American conservatives in the Administration are secretly giddy about recent European failures, but such sentiments are premature and wrong-headed; Europe is worth more to America strong than weak, especially, as I've said before, now that China's rise to the top seems all but inexorable. Energy independence has also been a big theme in Bush's Presidency; unfortunately, little concrete actions have been taken, partly because of political restrictions at home, and partly because of the same restrictions abroad. At least Congress is now seriously mulling the issue, but it remains to be seen what steps they can take to actually achieve something noticeable. Recent surges in oil prices (the price of oil went above $60 per barrel) have pushed the issue to the fore (or somewhere around there) of the legislative agenda. It is of vital concern to this country that it straighten this out, but I think ultimately not much will happen. To round out the foreign policy debate, we come to China, a nation that has already been mentioned a myriad of times in this analysis. Yes, that's how important China is. China has a population approaching 1.3 billion, the largest and quickly becoming one of the most technologically advanced militaries in the world, a nominal GDP of $1.8 trillion (the sixth largest in the world, according to the IMF April 2005 report) and a GDP PPP of $8 trillion (the second largest in the world), and economic growth at about 9 or 10% annually, a startling rate for such a huge economy. Even more dangerously, we're not really sure about China's intentions (and for that matter, China's not sure about ours). Bush has labeled China a "strategic competitor," but the term is vague, and while some advocate friendly relations others view the rising Red Star as a menace. It's a difficult position for America to be in; it is the world's superpower and it certainly doesn't want to lose that status, but here it has a nation that it can't blatantly confront for obvious reasons. Presumably, China will simply outdo America in a peaceful manner, not an unprecedented event after what happened in the Cold War. That, however, wouldn't be palatable to the American public, if I may be refined and eschew using the phrase, "it would suck." However, it's a reality that will simply have to be faced. I don't believe America is strong enough to stay on par with China; there is simply too much of a discrepancy in potential borne about by population differences. Bush has chosen an ambiguous path with China and I suppose future Presidents will have to correctly define to the American people what the nation's relations to China should and will be. Domestically, I am less impressed with Bush. I believe he has made severe gaffes with taxes, both at the federal level and the elimination of the estate tax. Unfortunately, Bush's mistakes contributed greatly to turning a wide surplus under Clinton into a gaping deficit, the largest in American history. Future generations will have to square off with this as well, on top of the problems they'll have to iron out regarding Social Security.

Overall, I would judge the Bush Presidency to have been mildly successful (very mild). American economic growth has picked up over the years and America's geostrategic strength relative to other nations is more advanced now than ever before. However, part of this (in fact, most of this) is simply due to macrohistorical trends and has little to do with Bush's effectiveness. Also, Bush has mishandled the economy and left plenty of future foreign policy problems. Holistically, however, the nation under the Administration has done fairly well. It is not easy to rebound after a tragedy like 9-11 (even for America), but this government has done a particularly decent job. A big chunk of how history remembers Bush and his government will evidently come from the Iraqi conflict. If that goes awry and America must extricate itself shamefully, then Bush will probably not be remembered too warmly. If the opposite becomes true, however, Bush can take comfort in knowing that his legacy will be secure. Everyone may agree, though, that these past few years have been interesting to say the least and that we look forward to the future and its promises of better days.